Abstract. We present a new multiagent learning algorithm, RV σ(t) , that builds on an earlier version, ReDVaLeR . ReDVaLeR could guarantee (a) convergence to best response against stationary opponents and either (b) constant bounded regret against arbitrary opponents, or (c) convergence to Nash equilibrium policies in self-play. But it makes two strong assumptions: (1) that it can distinguish between self-play and otherwise non-stationary agents and (2) that all agents know their portions of the same equilibrium in self-play. We show that the adaptive learnng rate of RV σ(t) that is explicitly dependent on time can overcome both of these assumptions. Consequently, RV σ(t) theoretically achieves (a') convergence to near-best response against eventually stationary opponents, (b') no-regret payoff against arbitrary opponents and (c') convergence to some Nash equilibrium policy in some classes of games, in self-play. Each agent now needs to know its portion of any equilibrium, and does not need to distinguish among nonstationary opponent types. This is also the first successful attempt (to our knowledge) at convergence of a no-regret algorithm in the Shapley game.
Introduction
Multiagent learning (MAL) in a reinforcement learning setting has been an active field of study recently. The problem is simply of multiple controllers trying to learn individually "optimal" control policies in a shared Markov Decision Process (MDP), often called a stochastic game or a Markov game. The difficulty arises from the fact that all agents are learning simultaneously, which means the MDP faced by each agent is essentially non-stationary. Hence, the concept of "optimal" policy becomes ill-defined, and depends on the collective behavior of the other agents. Previous research has attempted to tackle this problem by considering various opponent classes such that there is a well-defined "optimal policy" for the learner for each class of opponents. Typically the research contributions in this aspect has been to design learning algorithms that learn the appropriate behaviors for the corresponding class of opponents, without any access to the class information.
The present paper follows this line of research and makes several fundamental contributions. In particular, we point out that the class taxonomy of the opponents suggested so far is incomplete. We then fill the void and present the first algorithm that can tackle all opponent classes. More specifically, we present a new multiagent learning algorithm for repeated games, with the general philosophy of policy convergence against some classes of opponents but otherwise ensuring high payoffs. We build on our previous algorithm, ReDVaLeR [1] , that we proved to guarantee (a) convergence to best response against stationary opponents and either (b) constant bounded regret against arbitrary opponents or (c) convergence to Nash equilibrium policies in self-play. It was shown to achieve both (b) and (c) empirically but needed to assume that all agents must know their portions of the same equilibrium. In this paper we present a new technique extending ReDVaLeR , called RV σ (t) , that theoretically achieves (a') convergence to near-best response against eventually stationary opponents, (b') no-regret payoff against arbitrary opponents and (c') convergence to Nash equilibrium policies in some classes of games, in self-play. Each agent now needs to know only its portion of any equilibrium, besides the other assumptions made in ReDVaLeR . Additionally, since RV σ(t) can achieve both (b') and (c') simultaneously, it does not need to distinguish between a self-play agent and an otherwise non-stationary agent.
No-regret has been an attractive property for a learner facing unknown opponents -the case that precludes any meaningful definition of a "desirable behavior" even for the agent designer. In such cases, no-regret stipulates a specific behavior sequence that achieves "safe" play in terms of payoffs, but otherwise does not attempt convergence to any specific behavior. However, depending on the opponents, we may want a noregret learner to indeed converge to some policy, e.g., we would want it to converge to Nash equilibrium policy in self-play. Previous research [2] has empirically shown that in some games (such as the Shapley game in Table 1 ), no-regret learners are unable to converge in self-play. A major consequence of our theoretical results is that RV σ(t) is both no-regret and convergent in self-play in some classes of games that includes the Shapley game. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: sections 2 and 3 present the background and the related work respectively. In section 4 we present the RV σ(t) technique and in section 5, its analysis. We present our conclusions in section 6.
Multiagent Reinforcement Learning
A Multiagent Reinforcement Learning task is usually modeled as a Stochastic Game (SG, also called Markov Game), which is a Markov Decision Process with multiple controllers. We focus on stochastic games with a single state, also called repeated games. This refers to a scenario where a matrix game (defined below) is played repeatedly by multiple agents. We shall represent the action space of the ith agent as A i .
Definition 1
A matrix game with n players is given by an n-tuple of matrices, R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R n where R i is a matrix of dimension |A 1 | × |A 2 | . . . × |A n |, such that the payoff of the ith agent for the joint action (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) is given by the entry R i (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ), ∀i.
As is usual, we assume that payoffs are bounded, R i (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) ∈ [r i ,r i ], for real r i ,r i . Table 1 shows an example game of 2 players with 3 actions per player, called the Shapley game. A mixed policy, vector π i ∈ ∆(A i ) for agent i, is a probability distribution over A i . If the entire probability mass is concentrated on a single action (some actions), it is also called a pure policy (partially mixed policy). The joint policies of the opponents of the ith agent will be given by the vector π −i . We shall usually refer to the ith agent as the learner and the rest of the agents as the opponents. The expected payoff of the learner at any stage in which the policy tuple π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π n is followed is given by 
No player in this game has any incentive for unilateral deviation from the Nash equilibrium policy, given the others' policy. There always exists at least one such equilibrium profile for an arbitrary finite matrix game [3] . As an example, the only NE of the 2 player Shapley game in Table 1 
This compares the total payoff of the actual sequence of policies of the learner with the best response to the empirical distribution of the opponent.
Related Work
Multiagent Reinforcement Learning has produced primarily two types of algorithms. One type learns some fixed point of the game e.g., NE (Minimax-Q [4, 5] , Nash-Q [6] , FFQ [7] ) or correlated equilibrium (CE-Q [8] ). These algorithms can guarantee a certain minimal expected payoff asymptotically, but it may be possible to guarantee higher payoff in certain situations if the learner is adaptive to the opponents' play, instead of learning the game solution alone. This brings us to the other type of learners that learn a best response to the opponents' actual play e.g., IGA [9] , WoLF-IGA [10, 11] , AWE-SOME [12] . Since mutual best response is an equilibrium, two similar best responding players (such situations referred to as self-play) should be able to converge to an equilibrium. WoLF-IGA achieves this in 2 × 2 games (assuming it knows its portion of any equilibrium) and AWESOME achieves it for arbitrary sized games. But an AWESOME agent needs to know an entire equilibirum profile, meaning that it not only knows the others' equilibrium policy, but also that all agents agree on which equilibrium they know in games with multiple equilibria.
Performance guarantees during the learning process are provided by regret matching learners. These are algorithms that achieve lim T →∞
but their convergence properties in policies are unknown [13] [14] [15] [16] or at best limited [2] . A generalized version of IGA, called GIGA, was shown to be noregret [17] but its convergence property is unknown. Clearly, there was a need for a MAL algorithm that could address (eventually) stationary opponents and self-play as well as other types of opponents. Our previous work on ReDVaLeR [1] filled this void and allowed a learner to be no-regret against this large class of opponents, in addition to satisfying the base cases againt stationary and self-play opponents. Subsequently, the WoLF version of GIGA [18] was shown to be also no-regret but convergent to NE only in 2 × 2 games against GIGA. Our previous algorithm, ReDVaLeR [1] also had limitations. It was shown to achieve both convergence and no-regret in arbitrary sized games, but for conflicting settings of a parameter σ. Each ReDVaLeR agent was also assumed to know its portion of some equilibrium, i.e., there was agreement on equilibrium selection. Our present work builds on ReDVaLeR and uses a single time dependent σ that achieves both convergence and no-regret properties simultaneously. More importantly, we relax the assumption that agents agree on which equilibrium they know their portions of. Another recent work proposed a similar set of properties for a MAL algorithm, with a greater focus on payoff [19] . This algorithm achieves near best response against stationary players (in contrast we guarantee near best response against the larger set of eventually stationary opponents), at least non-Pareto dominated (by another equilibrium) equilibrium payoff in self-play (in contrast we provide convergence to some equilibrium policy), and at least the minimax payoff against all other players (in contrast, we guarantee the stronger property of no-regret payoff that could be greater than the minimax payoff depending on the opponents) in polynomial time. However, this algorithm needs to know the game matrix of all agents which is stronger than our 2 assumptions combined that the learner knows only its own game matrix and its portion of any equilibrium policy.
3. that the agents are given at the start, their portions of any equilibrium policy profile (like WoLF-IGA). They might see their portions of different equilibria in games with multiple equilibria.
We write the probability of the jth action of the ith agent at time t as π t i (j) and the expected payoff of this action against the opponent's current policy as
We use the ReDVaLeR algorithm (see [1] for details) with a time-varying schedule for σ in place of a constant. The discrete form of the algorithm (slightly different from [1] ) is
for η being a small step size and initial condition:
|Ai| . Note that the probability values generated above are automatically bounded in the range [0, 1] if r i ≥ 0. Also the distribution is indeed a probability distribution (i.e., sum 1) without the need of a projection operation unlike GIGA or GIGA-WoLF.
In continuous time, i.e., as η → 0, the above equation yields the same differential equation as ReDVaLeR for the dynamics of the n-player system
In contrast with [1] , the learning rates (l t i (j)) for this algorithm, RV σ(t) , are defined as
for a suitable σ-schedule as defined below.
Definition 5 (σ-Schedule)
A time decaying schedule for σ(t) is defined by the 3 conditions:
Analysis of RV σ(t)
In the following analysis, we shall use the symbol x to mean the L ∞ norm of a vector, i.e., x = max i |x i | and the symbol 1 to mean a vector of all 1's. We also assume that the game payoffs are all positive (i.e., r i ≥ 0), which is merely a technical assumption, since if the agent knows its game payoffs it can easily make an affine transformation to satisfy this assumption. The new game is strategically unchanged and the no-regret property also holds in the original game.
For the sake of brevity, we write
) be the Kullback Leibler divergence between the ith agent's policy at time t and an arbitrary distributionπ i , given by
With a slight abuse of notation, we will refer toḊ i or dDi dt as the projection of the gradient of the function D i (equation 4) along the solution trajectory of (2) 
Convergence against eventually stationary opponents
Here we establish that RV σ(t) with σ-schedule of definition 5 converges to the set ofbest responses against stationary opponents from which follow the convergence against eventually stationary opponents. The following lemma is used and is straightforward to prove.
Lemma 2 (Payoff-continuity)
If π i1 and π i2 are two policy vectors of agent i against the stationary joint policy of the opponents π −i and if
In other words, if two policies are close then so are their payoffs against a given joint policy of the opponents.
The following Theorem establishes that RV σ(t) with a non-stationary σ (Definition 5) converges to the set of -best responses against stationary opponents.
Theorem 3
For a given > 0, there exists a time τ , such that after τ a RV σ(t) agent i using σ-schedule in Definition 5 against n − 1 stationary agents, is guaranteed to converge to the set of -best response policies, BR i ,π−i .
Proof : Suppose the opponents' joint stationary policy is given by π −i , and let us consider someπ i ∈ BR i 0,π−i . Clearly the payoff of all policies in BR i 0,π−i have the same value and let this value beV i . At any given time t we consider the following two cases:
Now substitutingπ i in place of the arbitrary policy in Lemma 1, we get
Now according to Definition 5 there exists a time (τ ) such that for all t > τ , σ(t ) < 2Vi . Thus at all such times
This means, the policy approaches a best response at such times. By Lemma 2, the policy cannot approach a best response without its payoff approachingV i . Thus at some point t , the value of the policy will exceedV i − and so, π 
Then by Lemma 2,
is not an -best response, it is an ( + 2η|A i |r 2 i )-best response. Also from time t case 1 applies and both of the policy and the payoff approach that of a strict best response. Thus after τ , the payoff never falls belowV i − ( + 2η|A i |r An immediate corollary of Theorem 3 is that RV σ(t) will converge to an -best response even if the opponents do not always play stationary policies, as long as they settle down to a stationary profile at some finite time, τ 1 . This is justified by replacing τ in the proof of Theorem 3 by max{τ, τ 1 }. We state this result as the following corollary.
Corollary 4 If there exists a time τ 1 such that all other agents play stationary poli-
cies at all times t > τ 1 , then for a given > 0, there exists a time τ , such that after max{τ 1 , τ } an RV σ(t) agent i using σ-schedule in definition 5, is guaranteed to converge to the set of -best response policies, BR i ,π−i .
Note that this does not require all of the opponents to start playing a stationary profile simultaneously, only that the last opponent to settle down should do so at some finite time point τ 1 . Also note that this notion of eventually stationary opponent profile is a stronger condition than the non-stationary opponent policies with a limit considered in [20] . In the latter the opponents may never actually settle down but continue with an ever decreasing distance from a limiting profile.
No-regret property
Here we prove the no-regret property of RV σ(t) . Compared to ReDVaLeR , now the regret is no longer constant bounded but can grow with time. However, with the help of the following lemma (stated without proof) we can show that the average regret goes to 0.
Lemma 5 (Vanishing average) Given definition 5 for σ(t), we have lim T →∞
T 0 σ(t)dt T = 0.
Theorem 6 If a RV σ(t) agent i uses the decaying σ-schedule of definition 5, then
i.e., the algorithm is asymptotically no-regret.
Proof : As in Theorem 2 in [1], we have
Rearranging and again noting that D 0 ≤ log |A i | and thatπ i was chosen arbitrarily, we have
Thus the regret of the ith agent is bounded by
The result now follows from Lemma 5.
We postpone the choice of actual form of σ(t) till the end of section 5.3 in order to satisfy both convergence and no-regret, whereby we also compare the emerging expression of regret with those from GIGA, GIGA-WoLF.
Convergence in Self-play
Since we do not assume any coordination in the choice of the equilibrium, for games with multiple equilibria, the agents may be given their portions of different equilibria. Although this is not difficult to handle in 2×2 games [11] , in larger games this becomes a daunting task. In this paper we show that the variable learning rate is useful for this purpose, in games of any size but with a unique mixed equilibrium. Even though coordination in equilibrium selection is by default in such games, it has proven to be a hard case for convergence in self-play beyond 2 × 2 games. RV σ(t) is the first algorithm that extends this property to such games of arbitrary size, and this is also experimentally validated in two such games, viz., the Shapley game (Table 1 ) and the game in Table 2 with a unique partially mixed equilibrium. This is addition to RV σ(t) being convergent in all 2 × 2 games with possibly multiple equilibria, which we show next.
2 × 2 games In all 2 × 2 games, the RV σ(t) algorithm can be shown to be equivalent to WoLF-IGA. In cases where IGA converges (in policy) in self-play, only the direction of the gradient matters and this remains same for RV σ(t) . In the special case where WoLF-IGA (but not IGA) converges in policy, the learning rate change in RV σ(t) turns out to be the same as WoLF-IGA thus guaranteeing convergence like WoLF-IGA. Hence RV σ(t) always converges to an equilibrium policy in all 2 × 2 games, when given its portion of any equilibrium, similar to WoLF-IGA.
Games with unique mixed equilibrium
Here we prove that a σ-schedule can be designed satisfying definition 5 such that convergence to equilibrium can be achieved in these games. We make another technical assumption, that the minimum game payoff of i is strictly positive, r i > 0, for all i. Again this is easy to satisfy in self-play without changing the game strategically. The following lemmas will be used in the proof of the final Theorem for convergence of RV σ(t) in self-play.
As a first step we show that the requirement on the value of σ (i.e., σ = 1; Theorem 3 in [1] ) from the perspective of any learner i can be relaxed in two ways. The first is a direct but minor relaxation given by the lemma below.
Lemma 7 If the policy of i is not i -close to its equilibrium, i.e., min j |π
Proof : The proof closely follows Theorem 3 in [1] . In case 1 of that proof, σ only needs to be positive. It is really case 2 that needs to be relaxed. It is easily seen that the proof of case 2 in that theorem can be stated for individual agents as well. Consequently when
Now since min j |π
Equation 6 gives us The following lemma allows σ to approach 0 in self-play, but applies only when the others are sufficiently close to their portions of the equilibrium. First we define "sufficiently close". Let us write the vector of ith agents payoff, V j i over index j (j ∈ A i ), as V i . Also from Game Theory [21] we know that for a non-negative game with a unique completely mixed equilibrium there is a constant V * 
The equality of the last but one step follows from the fact that j:
Since the factor in the first square braces in the last step is strictly positive, the only situation when this is strictly negative is when σ(t) > c V * i . This makes D i Lyapunov implying convergence to π * i . Interestingly, if all agents are sufficiently close to their equilibria and all use the σ as in Lemma 8, then all of them will converge to their respective equilibria. This means for each i, V i − V * i 1 will decrease and that agent will be able to further decrease its σ with time while satisfying Lemma 8. The key is to get them sufficiently close to theirThus a RV σ(t) agent can use the above σ-schedule for convergence to equilibrium in self-play while being oblivious of the nature of the others. In case the others are not self-play agents, the same schedule will guarantee the results of Theorem 3, Corollary 4 and Theorem 6. Table 2 . A 3 actions game with lone mixed equilibrium. Theorem 10 basically says that if σ decays slow enough, then monotonic convergence of the sum of KL divergences can be achieved in self-play. For the following experiments we use a σ-schedule σ(t) = 1 1+β √ t (of the form of (9)) and show the results for various values of β in Figure 1 corresponding to the Shapley game (Table 1 ) and the game in Table 2 respectively. We used η = 2 × 10 −4 and the starting policies were selected close to the edges of the probability simplex since these are the policies that make convergence most difficult in RD. Note that the game in Table 1 is not strictly positive, and that in Table 2 is not strictly positive for the column agent. Also note that σ does not really need to be close to 1 as long as step 1 of Theorem 10 requires. In both experiments, in just 2000 iterations σ climbs down to less than 75% for the middle values of β as shown in Figure 1 . 
Conclusion
We have presented a modification of ReDVaLeR that could guarantee (a) convergence to best response against stationary opponents and either (b) constant bounded regret against arbitrary opponents, or (c) convergence to Nash equilibrium policies in selfplay. The original ReDVaLeR algorithm was shown to achieve both (b) and (c) empirically but assumed that all agents must know their portions of the same equilibrium.
The new algorithm, RV σ(t) , theoretically achieves (a') convergence to near-best response against eventually stationary opponents, (b') no-regret payoff against arbitrary opponents and (c') convergence to some Nash equilibrium policy in some classes of games, in self-play. Each agent now needs to know only its portion of any equilibrium. Although we have shown property c' in games with unique mixed equilibrium only, we have also found it to hold in some other classes of games, like coordination games (omitted here). Future work include further generalization and discrete analysis. We also intend to experiment further with learning rate schedules identical to GIGA to directly compare their regret growth rates.
